Can Populist Governments Always Crash the Economic System?
“Cambio, cambio.” Beneath the blazing sun, dozens of currency traders are offering US dollars along Florida Street, a lively shopping street in Buenos Aires. Referred to as arbolitos (“small trees”), their business is booming before the October 26 midterm elections in a nation long used to saving in the greenback.
“The optimal moment to buy is currently,” says one arbolito, declining to give her name. “[The dollar] went down a little but it’s deceptive – it will rebound.”
Like her, economic experts from all backgrounds anticipate a devaluation of the national currency once the election is over. The president has placed a limit on the peso to control triple-digit inflation and now it remains overvalued and reserves are depleted, causing the national economy sluggish as consumers opt for cheap imports.
Fertile Ground
The nation is a very special case. The country has been repeatedly racked by sovereign defaults and financial turmoil and its voters have been receptive for decades to left-leaning populist movements, in the form of the influential Peronist movement, and now the president’s rightwing version.
Milei is a textbook populist: charismatic, iconoclastic, promising forceful policies to wrestle back command of economic management from traditional elites on behalf of the people.
These defining traits are also seen in his ally in the United States, and by the UK politician, who presents himself as a pint-swilling people’s champion even though he is a privately educated former stockbroker.
Until recent months, Milei’s approach – involving extensive privatisations and severe public spending cuts – had earned praise from the IMF for helping to control price rises in check. This plan has something in common with the policies of Milei’s idol Margaret Thatcher, who also saw inflation as a monster to be slain, regardless of the consequences.
However investors began losing confidence in the government’s agenda in recent months following a poor performance in provincial elections and a series of graft allegations. Solely massive financial intervention by the US has prevented what seemed destined to be a full-blown monetary collapse.
Inconsistencies
The vote for Brexit in 2016 likely contained similar reasoning, and its leader, the former prime minister, swept away doubts about economic detail with a bullish determination to implement the “will of the people” despite elite opposition.
Farage has so far outlined limited plans in writing aside from proposals for mass deportations, that he later appeared to revise on the hoof. He wants to rein in the central bank, perhaps even replacing its head, the incumbent, with distrust toward traditional institutions as a central element of populist rhetoric.
His tax and spending policies seem in flux: concerned about being accused of proposing a Liz Truss-style splurge, he lately dropped a pledge to make significant tax reductions. His second-in-command, Richard Tice, stated they would focus instead on reductions in government expenditure.
Labour hopes this stance will enable it to portray Farage as intending to reintroduce fiscal tightening – an argument Rachel Reeves has made repeatedly, contrasting it with her approach of increasing public investment.
Jo Michell says there are contradictions within the populist platform, as it stands. “Reform are bankrolled by affluent backers calling for tax cuts and deregulation, yet also emphasizing the complaints of ordinary workers and the loss in manufacturing employment,” he explains. “There’s a tension here between wealthy supporters seeking radical free-market policies, and this story of bringing back British jobs and industrial revival.”
Maintaining Control
In truth, the evidence suggests neither left nor right populists often perform poorly when faced with practical difficulties (though of course each charismatic individual promises distinct solutions).
Recent research from a leading journal analysed the outcomes of dozens of populist leaders, over more than a century. It found typically, over the long term, GDP per capita tends to be a tenth less in nations governed by populist rulers compared to similar economies under conventional leadership.
“Economic disintegration, weakening economic fundamentals and the decay of governance usually go hand in hand under populist governments,” contend the researchers.
A further interesting result from the study, though, is despite their economic costs, these leaders are often effective at holding on to power, remaining in power for eight years, compared with four for their more moderate equivalents.
Put simply, it is not clear whether even if their policies fail, populists face immediate consequences at the ballot box. Like the Brexiters’ promise to regain sovereignty, their appeal extends past mundane economics.
Yet back in Buenos Aires, regardless of if Milei’s populist project fails or is kept on life support through foreign assistance, the Argentine people have already paid a heavy price.